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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
David Cunningham appeals the September 27, 2010 
judgment of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 210 months’ 
imprisonment and 20 years’ supervised release based on his 
conviction for the receipt and distribution of child 
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pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  At trial, 
the District Court allowed the government, over 
Cunningham’s objection, to show the jury two videos 
containing seven different video clips totaling approximately 
two minutes as a sample of the child pornography that gave 
rise to the charges.  Cunningham contends that, because the 
Court permitted the videos to be shown without first viewing 
the videos to determine whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighed their probative value, the 
Court erred and his conviction must be reversed.  We agree 
that the District Court abused its discretion, not only by 
failing to review the videos prior to admitting them but also 
by allowing all of those videos to be shown to the jury, 
because the highly inflammatory nature of two of them 
clearly and substantially outweighed their probative value 
pertaining to the crimes charged.  Those errors were not 
harmless, and we will therefore vacate and remand for a new 
trial. 
 
I. Background 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
According to the government’s evidence, Cunningham 
lived at 7 Mingo Creek Road, Eighty Four, Pennsylvania, a 
residence that he shared with two older siblings, Sarah and 
Harold.1
                                              
1 For simplicity, and meaning no disrespect by over-
familiarity, we will refer to Cunningham’s relatives by their 
first names. 
  His mother, Doris, also resided at that residence 
until her death in March 2007.   
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On June 19, 2007, Pennsylvania State Police Corporal 
Robert Erdely conducted an undercover online investigation 
of peer-to-peer file sharing networks.2  During that 
investigation, Erdely discovered a computer with an IP 
address located in southwestern Pennsylvania sharing over 
100 files on a peer-to-peer network known as Gnutella 
through a file sharing program known as LimeWire.  After 
looking at hash values that were being shared by that 
computer, Erdely recognized, based on previous 
investigations, numerous files with a hash value suggestive of 
child pornography.3
                                              
2 Peer-to-peer file sharing networks “utilize[] the 
Internet to allow individuals to share data contained in 
computer files.  [Peer-to-peer] file sharing can be used to 
share child pornography and trade digital files containing 
images of child pornography.”  United States v. Stults, 575 
F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2009). 
  Through a feature within Gnutella, 
Erdely was able to make a direct connection between his 
computer to the computer sharing the files, and downloaded 
six movies.  All six of the movies contained prepubescent 
children engaging in sexual activity.  After reviewing the 
downloaded video files, Erdely obtained a court order to 
identify the IP address that had shared the files in question, 
and it was determined that the subscriber of the IP address 
3 Each hash value “is an alphanumeric string that 
serves to identify an individual digital file as a kind of ‘digital 
fingerprint.’  Although it may be possible for two digital files 
to have hash values that ‘collide,’ or overlap, it is unlikely 
that the values of two dissimilar images will do so.”  United 
States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d 224, 226 n.2 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted).  
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was registered to Cunningham’s deceased mother, Doris, at 7 
Mingo Creek Road, Eighty Four, Pennsylvania.4
 
    
Thereafter, a federal search warrant was obtained for 7 
Mingo Creek, and Erdely, along with another Pennsylvania 
state trooper and several FBI agents, executed the warrant on 
July 17, 2007.  Although Cunningham was not at his 
residence when the investigators arrived, they identified 
themselves to Sarah and Harold, and explained to them the 
nature of the investigation.  Sarah informed the investigators 
that the only working computer in the residence belonged to 
Cunningham and was located in his bedroom.  Erdely and the 
agents then searched Cunningham’s bedroom, where they 
found mail and paperwork addressed to Cunningham.  Erdely 
seized the computer and undertook a preliminary review of its 
hard drive.  During that review, Erdely found that 36 out of 
212 shared files contained child pornography.   
 
Cunningham returned to the residence while the search 
was ongoing.  He admitted to installing LimeWire on his 
computer, and that he had used LimeWire to search for 
pornography in general.  According to testimony from the 
FBI agents at trial, Cunningham also admitted that he had 
downloaded child pornography using LimeWire, had been 
looking at child pornography on the computer and on 
LimeWire since 2006, and had used search terms like “child,” 
“kiddy,” and “PTHC” [pre-teen hardcore] to download files 
                                              
4 The e-mail address associated with the internet 
account that the computer user chose was 
“reptilewild@comcast.net.”  The record indicates that, 
beginning in 1998, Cunningham had been involved in the 
care, breeding, trade, and exhibition of reptiles. 
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from LimeWire.  There was also testimony that, after Erdely 
showed Cunningham the list of all of the file names on the 
seized computer, Cunningham acknowledged that those files 
were from his shared directory, and he estimated that child 
pornography comprised 20 to 30 percent of the material on 
his computer.5
 
   
Forensic analysis of the computer found in 
Cunningham’s bedroom revealed that 46 of the 212 files in 
the shared directory contained child pornography.  In 
addition, a search of a folder that contained files that were not 
completely downloaded revealed 11 more videos that 
contained child pornography.  A list of search terms, many of 
which referred to child pornography, was also recovered from 
the computer.  Subsequent to that analysis, Cunningham was 
arrested and charged in a three count indictment for receiving, 
possessing, and distributing child pornography.  He pled not 
guilty to all charges.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
1. Pretrial Proceedings 
 
Prior to trial, Cunningham filed a Motion in Limine 
Concerning Pornographic Images and File Names.  In that 
motion, he requested, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
403,6
                                              
5 Cunningham later testified to viewing child 
pornography in 2001 and 2006, but denied telling the 
investigators that he had downloaded child pornography or 
searched for it.   
 an order precluding the government from showing the 
6 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: “The court 
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jury any of the child pornography videos recovered from the 
computer.  Cunningham argued that, because he was 
stipulating that the government exhibits constituted child 
pornography, the probative value of any videos was 
substantially decreased.  The District Court issued an order 
denying Cunningham’s motion, allowing the government to 
publish “representative samples of the Child Pornography 
instead of the entire ‘collections,’ as well as the file names of 
the various files in the ‘collection.’”  (App. at 1.)7
 
  The 
Court’s order also noted that “the parties may (but are not 
required to) stipulate that the child pornography evidence 
constitutes child pornography for the purposes of the 
Indictment.”  (Id.)  Following the Court’s direction to “meet 
in an attempt to stipulate to a Joint Cautionary Jury 
Instruction” (id.), the parties agreed to the following 
stipulation: 
[T]hat the video files obtained from IP address 
71.206.239.202 on June 19, 2007, constitute 
visual depictions of real children under the age 
of 18 engaging in sexually explicit content.  The 
parties further stipulate and agree that the video 
files recovered from the computer at 7 Mingo 
Creek Road on July 17, 2007, constitute visual 
                                                                                                     
may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
7 Citations to “(App. at [page number])” are to the 
Appellant’s four volume appendix in the present appeal.   
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depictions of real children under the age of 18 
years of age engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct. 
(Id. at 196-97.)   
 
Five days later, Cunningham filed a Motion to Limit 
Evidence of Child Pornography.  That motion, which noted 
that the government had provided defense counsel with the 
video clips that it intended to introduce at trial, described 
those proposed video excerpts in graphic detail:8
 
 
These clips include graphic and haunting 
images of child pornography.  Specifically, they 
include a close up of an adult woman licking a 
very young female child’s genitalia – so young, 
in fact, the child appears to be a toddler; videos 
of penetration; several videos depicting children 
tied up and/or blindfolded, including images 
where a young, prepubescent girl was 
penetrated by an adult male while her ankles 
and wrists appeared to be bound to a table.  
Several videos showed the faces of the children.  
In every image where a face is shown, the body 
                                              
8 In many, perhaps most, opinions addressing child 
pornography prosecutions, it is possible to resolve the legal 
issues without subjecting the reader to the graphic and 
disturbing details of the pornography.  Because of the 
character of the issues confronting us here, however, we 
cannot avoid the details.  In fact, it will be necessary to 
provide more graphic detail later herein.  See infra note 10 
and accompanying text. 
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(specifically, breasts, genitalia, and lack of 
pubic hair) clearly, and unequivocally, proves 
that the image portrays a child.  In one, a young 
girl is seen performing oral sex on an adult 
male, who ejaculates on her face, which is 
openly displayed for the camera.9
                                              
9 The government did not provide a description of the 
proposed video excerpts to the District Court when arguing to 
the Court that those excerpts should be admitted.  The only 
descriptions that the government had provided to the Court of 
any of the videos giving rise to the charges was in its 
response to a pretrial motion to suppress filed by 
Cunningham.  In that response, the government gave brief 
descriptions of the six videos that Erdely had downloaded 
from the IP address during his undercover investigation on 
June 19, 2007.  The descriptions provided to the Court were 
as follows (without the explicit file names): 
 
[A] pre-pubescent female performs oral sex on 
an apparent adult male, and engages in sexual 
intercourse with an adult male; 
… 
[A] pre-pubescent female and male child 
engage in sex acts upon each other.  The 
children are appear [sic] to be 10 years old; 
… 
[A] female child approximately 6 years-old 
performs oral sex on an adult male; 
… 
[A]n adult female performs oral sex on an infant 
10 
 
(Id. at 201 (internal footnote omitted).)  Cunningham argued 
that those “images not only reveal children engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; they are obscene, violent, and 
humiliating, necessarily conjuring feelings of disgust and 
blind rage.”  (Id.)  Cunningham objected to the government’s 
video excerpts and proposed that, if the Court was going to 
allow the government to introduce those exhibits, they should 
be limited in four ways: (1) only still images of any video 
should be shown; (2) no images, whether still or part of a 
video, should display bondage or actual violence, including 
the penetration of prepubescent children by adults; (3) no 
audio should accompany any of the video; and (4) the faces of 
any minors should be obscured from all images.   
 
In response to that motion, the government agreed not 
to use audio in the video excerpts, but it “strenuously 
                                                                                                     
child approximately 2 years old; 
… 
[A]n apparent 12 year-old female is seen in the 
video dancing.  The child pulls down her pants 
exposing her vagina and then pulls up her shirt 
exposing her breasts.  The child appears to be 
pre-pubescent; 
… 
[A]n apparent 6 year-old male child (pre-
pubescent) engages in sexual intercourse with 
an adult female. 
(S. App. at 11-13.)  As discussed later herein, excerpts from 
some of those six videos were eventually shown to the jury. 
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object[ed] to the [other] limitations urged by [Cunningham] 
as efforts to sanitize, distort and mitigate the force of 
evidence that constitutes the very evidence of the offenses 
charged.”  (Id. at 222.)  The government argued that, even 
with the stipulation, it bore “an extremely high burden to 
establish … that the defendant knowingly distributed, 
received and possessed these images, that he was aware of 
their character as child pornography, [and] that he was aware 
that the images depicted real minors engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.”  (Id. at 223.)  Therefore, the government 
contended that “it would be unfair to say that, because the 
defendant offered to stipulate to some of what the government 
needs to prove, the government should be hindered in its 
ability to satisfy its remaining obligation of proof.”  (Id. at 
223-24.) 
 
In specifically arguing against the omission of excerpts 
that portray bondage and actual violence, the government 
noted that “[t]he average person … is not aware … [that] the 
content at issue … may contain depictions of sado-
masochistic sexual abuse,” and that child pornography, in 
general, contains “frequent depictions of the documented 
sexual assault of children by adults with whom they come 
into contact.”  (Id. at 226.)  Thus, the government contended 
that the jury should be allowed to see such depictions to 
“fully appreciate the nature of child pornography crimes, 
which necessitates consideration of the images themselves.”  
(Id. at 227.)  The government represented that it had “pre-
selected clips of videos that [were] representative of the full 
collection,” and “propose[d] to admit and publish 7, several-
second video clips, from in excess of 50 such videos, some of 
which were originally as long as 30 minutes.”  (Id. at 227.)  
The government asserted that it had been responsive to 
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Cunningham’s concerns by “agree[ing] to omit one of two 
videos which depict[ed] sado-masochistic sexual abuse of 
minors.”  (Id.) 
 
Relying only on the papers submitted, the District 
Court denied Cunningham’s motion with the exception of 
granting his request – already agreed to by the government – 
that no audio be used in the video images presented.  The 
Court held that the government was entitled to prove its case 
in the manner that it chose, although the Court noted its hope 
that the government would do so “in a condensed format.”  
(Id. at 4.)  Additionally, the Court found that “still images 
[were] not representative of the actual evidence in this case.”  
(Id.)  As to Cunningham’s other requests, including for a 
prohibition of images that depicted actual violence, the Court 
decided it would not grant them because they would “restrict 
the actual character of the evidence.”  (Id. at 5.)  In 
conclusion, the Court, without having watched the video 
excerpts, held that, “[a]fter conducting a balancing of the 
evidence under [Rule 403], the probative value of [the] 
evidence [was] not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.”  (Id.)    
 
At the final pretrial conference held on April 8, 2010, 
Cunningham advised the Court of his intent to file a motion 
for reconsideration of the video excerpts’ admissibility, and 
asked the Court to review the excerpts prior to ruling.  The 
Court immediately denied that motion, saying that counsel 
“had plenty of time to file motion after motion, which 
[counsel had] done.” (Id. at 253.)  The Court noted that it had 
“ruled again and again and again; and [was] sorry [counsel] 
[did not] like it, but … [counsel] [could not] come in every 
day and give us another snapshot and more motions, and the 
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next day another snapshot and more motions.”  (Id.)  
However, notwithstanding that oral ruling, the Court said that 
if Cunningham wanted to file a motion, he needed to do so by 
4:00 p.m. that day.   
 
Cunningham complied with that directive and filed the 
motion later that day.  In the motion, Cunningham asserted 
that his defense was that someone else had downloaded, 
possessed, and distributed the child pornography at issue, and, 
in addition to the stipulation already made, he agreed that 
whoever possessed, received, and distributed those images 
would know that they depicted real children engaging in 
sexually explicit activity.  As a result, he argued there was 
little value in presenting the video excerpts, especially 
considering “the uniqueness and significance of this type of 
contraband.”  (Id. at 265.)  Therefore, Cunningham urged the 
Court to rule that the video excerpts were inadmissible, or 
alternatively, subject to further limitations.  Once again, 
Cunningham requested that the Court view the video excerpts 
prior to making a ruling on their admissibility.   
 
On April 12, 2010, the Court denied Cunningham’s 
motion.  The Court stated that Cunningham “cite[d] no case 
precedent for its proposition that the child pornography must 
be viewed by the Court or that it is a necessary exercise of the 
Court’s discretion to do so.”  (Id. at 17.)  The Court found 
that “the descriptions [of the video excerpts] [were] sufficient 
for [it] to rule [on the past and pending motions], since the 
descriptions [were] quite telling of the images and their 
graphic nature.”  (Id. at 17-18.)  Thereafter, Cunningham 
proceeded to trial.   
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2. Jury Trial 
 
a) Voir Dire 
 
Prior to voir dire, Cunningham requested that the 
District Court advise all potential jurors that, if selected, they 
would “see a movie that shows a prepubescent minor being 
sexually penetrated by an adult,” and “see graphic images of 
children, their genitals, and videos of illegal sexual acts, 
including oral sex, sexual intercourse, and graphic, violent, 
sexual images.”  (Id. at 170-71.)  The Court did not adopt that 
preview of the evidence.  Instead, during voir dire, the Court 
provided all potential jurors with the following information 
and asked them the following question: 
 
[T]his case involves an accusation that the 
Defendant received, possessed and distributed 
child pornography.  During this trial you will be 
shown child pornography including graphic 
images and hear descriptions of computer files 
including graphic and offensive file names 
which will certainly be disturbing to most if not 
all of you. 
Regardless of your feelings on this subject 
matter and the graphic nature of the material 
presented, are you able to render a fair and 
impartial verdict based solely on the evidence 
presented in this court and my instructions to 
you on the law?   
(Id. at 302-03.)  After hearing that, several jurors responded 
that they might have difficulty being impartial, and, as a 
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result, were excused for cause.  When counsel and the Court 
further questioned other jurors individually at sidebar 
regarding answers they had given about their impartiality, 
more detailed information on the pornography was revealed 
and a few of those jurors were subsequently excused for 
cause.  One potential juror, after learning that the videos 
would show children under the age of eight, determined that it 
would be difficult to be impartial.  Another potential juror 
was excused for cause after she indicated her distress at the 
revelation that the videos would include portrayals of children 
as young as toddlers being molested.   
 
b) Video Excerpts 
 
 During trial, over Cunningham’s objection, the 
government offered into evidence, and played for the jury, 
two separate videos containing a total of seven video excerpts 
of the child pornography either obtained from the IP address 
registered to Cunningham’s deceased mother or recovered 
from the computer seized from Cunningham’s bedroom.  The 
first video, approximately a minute in length, contained 
excerpts from three of the six videos that Erdely had obtained 
from the IP address on June 19, 2007.  The following are 
descriptions of those video excerpts:10
                                              
10 Although the government provided us with these 
very detailed descriptions of the seven video excerpts in its 
appellate brief, it did not provide any description of the 
excerpts to the District Court when it was arguing that the 
video excerpts should be admitted.  See supra note 
 
9.  The 
summary of the video excerpts furnished to the District Court 
by Cunningham at the time was also graphic, see supra note 8 
and accompanying text, but it did not contain the level of 
16 
 
[Excerpt 111
… 
 (20 seconds of total file length of 
2:16):]  The video depicts an adult woman 
licking and digitally manipulating the genitals 
of a very young appearing pre-pubescent child.  
At the end of the clip, the same woman is 
shown on her back, with a nude male pre-
pubescent child facing her. 
[Excerpt 2 (27 seconds of total file length of 
1:30):]  This video depicts two pre-pubescent 
boys engaging in vaginal intercourse with an 
adult woman.  The woman is then depicted 
kissing their penises.  A clothed adult male is 
then shown, and one of the pre-pubescent boys 
is seen unzipping the adult male’s pants.  In the 
next clip, which is of poor quality, the pre-
pubescent child appears to be sucking on the 
adult male’s penis while being coached by the 
adult female. 
                                                                                                     
detail that the government has provided to us.  To say that the 
government’s descriptions of the video excerpts are 
loathsome is an understatement.  However, we reproduce the 
full description of each video excerpt because, as mentioned 
earlier, supra note 8, an understanding of the aggregate effect 
of the content contained in each video excerpt bears on our 
holding in this case. 
11 For ease of reference to certain excerpts that are 
discussed later herein, we assign a number to each of the 
seven video excerpts. 
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… 
[Excerpt 3 (18 seconds of total file length of 21 
seconds):]  A prepubescent female child is 
shown pulling her pants to expose her nude 
genitalia, which is undeveloped and lacks pubic 
hair.  She then pulls up her shirt to reveal her 
breasts, which are undeveloped.  Another child 
can be seen in the background, also exposing 
nude breasts which are undeveloped, the child 
could be a male or female child. 
(Appellee’s Br. at 16.) 
The second video, also approximately a minute in 
length, contained excerpts from four of the more than forty 
videos seized from the computer found in Cunningham’s 
bedroom following the execution of the search warrant.  
Those excerpts contained the following depictions: 
 
[Excerpt 1 (17 seconds of total file length of 
3:23):]  Prepubescent female child is shown 
dropping skirt, and exposing her nude genitalia.  
This child is then depicted nude with rope 
encircling her breasts and going up to her neck.  
She is standing and appears to be suspended 
from a ceiling with her arms above her.  An 
adult male stands behind her.  He is 
aggressively manipulating her genitalia while 
masturbating himself.  Child is then depicted 
with thicker rope retraining [sic] her, as she is 
reclined and tied to a bench.  Rope binds her 
legs and midsection.  She has a mask on her 
face.  An adult male stands above her, and 
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manipulates her genitalia.  The child flinches.  
The adult male stands over her and inserts his 
penis into her mouth. 
… 
[Excerpt 2 (20 seconds of total file length of 
14:12):]  Prepubescent nude female child 
performs oral sex on an adult male, while 
straddling him from above.  Her genitals appear 
to be in the area of his head or face.  Child then 
shown lying beside with [sic] the adult male, 
with her hand in [sic] his erect penis.  Video 
then depicts a close-up of the child’s genitalia, 
she is on all fours peering back between her 
legs at the camera.  The adult male is 
manipulating her genitals for the camera with 
his thumb.  Adult male is then shown 
masturbating, the child is standing or kneeling 
with her mouth near his penis.  There are 
multiple shots of the child handling the adult 
male’s penis.  The final clip shows the child, 
nude with ejaculate on her face and chest as she 
looks at the camera. 
… 
[Excerpt 3 (17 seconds of total file length of 
2:55):]  This video depicts a very young 
(perhaps 3-5 years of age) nude female child 
being suspended upside down, while an adult 
male vaginally penetrates her with his penis.  
The screen then depicts a close up of an adult 
male penis being forced into a child’s vagina 
19 
 
while the child is held upside-down by the adult 
male.  The video finally depicts a close up view 
of an adult male anally penetrating the child 
from behind.  The adult male withdraws his 
penis, and ejaculates upon the back of the child. 
… 
[Excerpt 4 (14 seconds of total file length of 21 
seconds):]  A female prepubescent child pulls 
down her pants while facing a webcam and 
displays her buttocks and genitals. 
(Id. at 17-18.)  Both before and after each of the video 
excerpts were played for the jury, the District Court read a 
cautionary instruction, which directed the jury to view the 
images in a fair and impartial manner.  
 
3. Conviction and Sentencing  
 
The jury convicted Cunningham on all counts.  
 
On September 27, 2010, the District Court sentenced 
Cunningham to 210 months’ imprisonment for receiving child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (“Count 
One”), and 120 months’ imprisonment for distributing child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C § 2252(a)(2) (“Count 
Three”), to be served concurrently.  The District Court 
vacated Cunningham’s conviction for possessing child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (“Count 
Two”) due to double jeopardy concerns, and dismissed that 
count without prejudice.  The Court also imposed a 20-year 
term of supervised release, which included a condition 
20 
 
prohibiting Cunningham from accessing the internet during 
that period except for employment purposes.12
 
   
Cunningham timely appealed his conviction.13
                                              
12 Specifically, that condition provided: 
 
The defendant is permitted to possess and/or 
use a computer and cell phone, however, is 
prohibited from accessing the Internet through 
any device.  This prohibition includes using any 
Internet Service Provider, bulletin board system 
or any other public or private computer network 
or service.  If the defendant’s employment 
requires the use of a computer and/or access to 
the Internet, the defendant is permitted Internet 
access for this limited purpose, and the 
defendant shall notify the employer of the 
nature of his or her conviction (charge).  The 
probation / pre-trial services officer shall 
confirm the defendant’s compliance with this 
notification requirement. 
(App. at 110.) 
13 On August 31, 2010, following Cunningham’s 
conviction but prior to his sentencing, the Office of the Public 
Defender for the Western District of Pennsylvania (“OFPD”) 
moved to disqualify the District Judge from presiding over 
this case and 20 other pending cases based on comments 
made by the District Judge in two unrelated cases where the 
OFPD served as defense counsel.  Without recounting the 
tortuous history of those two cases, suffice it to say that the 
District Judge initially disqualified himself from 
Cunningham’s case.  On September 20, 2010, however, after  
21 
 
II. Discussion14
 
 
Cunningham argues that the Court erred in both failing 
to view the video excerpts before ruling on their admissibility 
and in failing to exclude or limit them, given his stipulation to 
their criminal content.  He further contends that the Court 
abused its discretion during voir dire by refusing to provide 
potential jurors with more detail describing the videos that 
would be presented during trial.15
                                                                                                     
the government filed a motion for reconsideration, the 
District Judge changed course and decided to continue to 
preside over Cunningham’s case.  On July 31, 2012, after 
Cunningham appealed to us and after we heard oral argument, 
the District Judge entered an order taking his original position 
that recusal was warranted and directing that, if we were to 
remand Cunningham’s case for a new trial or re-sentencing, it 
should be assigned to another judge.  In light of that order, the 
recusal issue is moot. 
  We address those 
arguments in turn. 
14 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
15 Cunningham also challenges the District Court’s 
disqualification ruling which, as noted, is now moot.  See 
supra note 13.  Cunningham additionally argues that the 
Court plainly erred by imposing, as a condition of his 20-year 
supervised release, a complete ban on internet access except 
for work purposes.  Since we are vacating Cunningham’s 
conviction, we need not directly address that contention.  We 
do note, however, that the internet restriction imposed upon 
Cunningham is broader than the one that we found 
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A. Admission of Video Excerpts Under Rule 403 
 
We review a district court’s ruling to admit or exclude 
evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.  United States 
v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).  “An abuse of 
discretion occurs only where the district court’s decision is 
‘arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable … .’”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 
2009)). 
 
1. Procedural Error 
 
Cunningham contends that the District Court abused 
its discretion when it failed to view the government’s 
proposed video exhibits before ruling on their admissibility.  
The government responds that the District Court had no duty 
to view the video excerpts because it understood the content 
and character of the excerpts that the government intended to 
offer from the summary that Cunningham had provided to the 
Court.16
                                                                                                     
problematic in United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191 (3d 
Cir. 2011), and we urge district courts, when imposing similar 
conditions, “to fashion a ‘comprehensive, reasonably tailored 
scheme,’” id. at 200 (quoting United States v. Miller, 594 
F.3d 172, 188 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
  We agree with Cunningham that, under the 
circumstances of this case, the Court abused its discretion by 
admitting the videos without first viewing them. 
16 The government also reminds us that, prior to the 
motions in limine, it had told the Court about some of the 
videos in connection with Cunningham’s suppression motion.  
See supra note 9. 
23 
 
 
While the question presented for resolution has seldom 
been addressed, we find guidance in decisions from two of 
our sister circuits.  In United States v. Curtin, the defendant 
was charged with traveling across state lines with the intent to 
engage in a sexual act with a minor and using an interstate 
facility to attempt to persuade a minor to engage in sexual 
acts.  489 F.3d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).  The only 
disputed issue was whether Curtin intended to engage in sex 
acts with a minor or with an adult who was pretending to be a 
child having incestuous sex with her father.  Id. at 938-39.  To 
prove Curtin’s unlawful intent, the government offered five 
stories that had been found on his personal digital assistant, 
all of which involved sex between fathers and their child 
daughters.  Id. at 942.  Although Curtin objected to the 
evidence as inadmissible propensity evidence under Rule 
404(a),17 the district court, without reading all of the stories, 
agreed with the government that the stories in their entirety 
were, with a limiting instruction, admissible under Rule 
404(b).18
                                              
17 Subject to exceptions set forth in Rule 404(a)(2) and 
(3), Rule 404(a)(1)  provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s 
character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character or trait.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). 
  Id.  The district court had read two of the stories in 
18 Rule 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, 
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s 
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 
person acted in accordance with the character.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(1).  However, Rule 404(b)(2) provides that evidence 
otherwise inadmissible under Rule 404(b)(1) “may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
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full, but it had only read “snippets” of the other three and 
relied on an offer of proof from the government for those 
stories.  Id. at 956. 
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, “hold[ing] as a matter of 
law that a court does not properly exercise its balancing 
discretion under Rule 403 when it fails to place on the scales 
and personally examine and evaluate all that it must weigh”  
Id. at 958.  It found that “[t]he inflammatory nature and 
reprehensible nature of [those] abhorrent stories, although 
generally relevant, is such that a district court making a Rule 
403 determination must know precisely what is in the stories 
in order for its weighing discretion to be properly exercised 
and entitled to deference on appeal.”  Id. at 957.  The Ninth 
Circuit stated that “[t]he record [in Curtin] demonstrate[d] 
why [that] must be the rule,” since a portion of one of the 
stories that the government offered was clearly inadmissible 
as it was “both irrelevant and dangerously prejudicial.”19
                                                                                                     
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(2). 
  Id.  
The Ninth Circuit noted that “[r]elying only on the 
descriptions of adversary counsel [was] insufficient to ensure 
that a defendant receives the due process and fair trial to 
which he is entitled under our Constitution.”  Id. at 958.  
Additionally, “given the depraved and patently prejudicial 
19 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit pointed to one of the 
exhibits that contained “a particularly graphic description of 
[a minor female] engaged in sexual acts of mutual oral 
copulation with, and masturbation of, a dog.”  Curtin, 489 
F.3d at 957.   
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nature of the irrelevant evidence,” the court rejected the 
government’s assertion that the error was harmless.20
 
  Id. 
                                              
20 The government argues that Curtin is 
distinguishable for several reasons: because a portion of one 
of the stories there was clearly inadmissible while the video 
excerpts here were, in fact, clearly admissible; because the 
evidence in Curtin was admitted under Rule 404(b)(2) and 
thus was extrinsic to the crimes charged, whereas here the 
video excerpts formed the basis of the crimes charged; and 
because the district court in Curtin did not have an 
understanding of all of the material in the stories, whereas 
here the Court understood the nature of the video excerpts.  
As we will discuss in greater detail infra, we disagree with 
the government’s first contention.  Regarding the second 
contention, although we recognize that the evidence here was 
offered to prove the mental state of the underlying crimes 
charged, as opposed to being offered to prove intent under 
Rule 404(b)(2), Curtin’s holding was not contingent on 
whether the challenged evidence was intrinsic or extrinsic to 
the crimes charged; rather, no matter the basis under which 
the evidence is being offered, it held that “[o]ne cannot 
evaluate in a Rule 403 context what one has not seen or read.”  
Curtin, 489 F.3d at 958.  We also disagree with the 
government’s third assertion because the district court in 
Curtin had at least read two of the five stories and had offers 
of proof on the other three (albeit from adversary counsel).  
Here, even though the District Court had a description of the 
video excerpts from Cunningham (albeit in less detail than the 
government has provided to us on appeal), the District Court 
refused to watch any of the video excerpts. 
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In United States v. Loughry, the defendant was 
convicted of advertising and conspiracy to advertise child 
pornography, and distributing and conspiracy to distribute 
child pornography through an online cache.21  660 F.3d 965, 
967-68 (7th Cir. 2011).  However, Loughry was not charged 
with possession of child pornography.  Id. at 968.  To prove 
intent and motive to join the conspiracy, the government 
introduced, pursuant to Rule 414,22
                                              
21 In fact, the online depository was called the 
“Cache.”  Id. at 967.  “[T]he purpose of the Cache was to 
provide its members with access to child pornography 
consisting of the lascivious exhibition of the genitals of minor 
girls.”  Id. at 968.   
 evidence of photographs 
and videos of child pornography found on Loughry’s home 
computer.  Id. at 969.  Though some of the images were 
similar to those posted on the online cache, other images, 
classified as “hard core,” id. at 969, “were more inflammatory 
and were prohibited by Cache ‘rules,’” id. at 968.  
Additionally, the government did not charge Loughry with 
distributing or advertising any of those images submitted into 
22 Rule 414(a) provides that, “[i]n a criminal case in 
which a defendant is accused of child molestation, the court 
may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other 
child molestation.  The evidence may be considered on any 
matter to which it is relevant.”  Fed. R. Evid. 414(a).  “The 
term ‘child molestation’ encompasses ... the distribution, 
advertising, or possession of child pornography.” Loughry, 
660 F.3d at 969 (citing Rule 414(d)).  “Rule 414 constitutes 
an exception to the rule that evidence of prior bad acts is not 
admissible to show a defendant’s propensity to commit the 
offense charged.”  Id. 
27 
 
evidence.  Id.  Nonetheless, the district court found that those 
images were admissible under Rule 414, id. at 968, even 
though it did not review the disputed evidence before 
admitting it, id. at 970.  The district court readily 
acknowledged as much, stating that it was “at somewhat of a 
disadvantage not knowing exactly what items and depictions 
… [were] on [the] [g]overnment’s [exhibits],” but still relied 
on the government’s descriptions of the contested evidence 
when making its Rule 403 determination.  Id. 
 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, “emphasiz[ing] that a 
district court, in exercising its discretion under Rule 403, 
must carefully analyze and assess the prejudicial effect of 
challenged evidence.”  Id. at 971 (citations omitted).  The 
Seventh Circuit did make clear, however, that an exception to 
reviewing contested evidence might exist in “cases where the 
probative value of the evidence is so minimal that it will be 
obvious to the court that the potential prejudice to the 
defendant substantially outweighs any probative value the 
evidence might have.”  Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez-
Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where the 
evidence is of very slight (if any) probative value, it’s an 
abuse of discretion to admit it if there’s even a modest 
likelihood of unfair prejudice or a small risk of misleading the 
jury.”)).  “The safest course,” the Seventh Circuit advised, “is 
for the court to review the contested evidence for itself.”  Id.  
Applying those principles, the Loughry court held that: 
 
The challenged videos include the kind of 
highly reprehensible and offensive content that 
might lead a jury to convict because it thinks 
that the defendant is a bad person and deserves 
punishment, regardless of whether the 
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defendant committed the charged crime.  Given 
the inflammatory nature of the evidence, the 
district court needed to know what was in the 
photographs and videos in order for it to 
properly exercise its discretion under Rule 403.  
Without looking at the videos for itself, the 
court could not have fully assessed the potential 
prejudice to Loughry and weighed it against the 
evidence’s probative value. 
Id. at 972.  The Seventh Circuit thus held that “the district 
court abused its discretion under Rule 403 when it failed to 
review the challenged videos before they were admitted in 
evidence.”  Id. 
 
We note that, although the challenged evidence in 
Loughry did not form the basis of the underlying crimes, as 
did the videos in this case, the Loughry court, like the Curtin 
court, did not make a distinction between extrinsic and 
intrinsic evidence.  Rather, the Loughry court focused on the 
inflammatory character of the evidence and concluded that 
“the district court needed to know what was in the 
photographs and videos in order for it to properly exercise its 
discretion under Rule 403.”  Id.  The same rationale applies 
here.  Because of the deeply disgusting, inflammatory 
character of the videos, the District Court “could not have 
fully assessed the potential prejudice” to Cunningham “and 
weighed it against the evidence’s probative value” without 
looking at the video excerpts themselves.  Id.  Although the 
Court arguably had more vivid descriptions of some of the 
video excerpts than the district court did in Loughry, see id. at 
972 (“Few if any, details were provided to the court when it 
was deciding whether to admit the evidence.”), having those 
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descriptions should have heightened the District Court’s 
awareness of the need to see the videos to assess their 
prejudicial impact before it decided to admit them.23
 
 
In sum, we find both Curtin and Loughry persuasive.  
We agree that a district court should know what the 
challenged evidence actually is – as opposed to what one side 
or the other says it is – “in order for [the court’s] weighing 
discretion to be properly exercised and entitled to deference 
on appeal.”  Curtin, 489 F.3d at 957.  We also agree that there 
may be instances where a district court can properly decline 
to view challenged evidence when it is obvious to the court 
that the danger of unfair prejudice from such evidence 
substantially outweighs any probative value that it might 
have.  Loughry, 660 F.3d at 971. 
 
Thus, we conclude that, speaking generally, a district 
court should personally examine challenged evidence before 
                                              
23 We emphasize that there was a stipulation in place 
here establishing the criminal content of the videos, and that 
too needed to be on the scales when assessing the probative 
value of the videos against the danger of unfair prejudice.  
See infra Part II.A.2.  We do not imply that a defendant can 
stipulate away the prosecution’s right to determine how to 
prove its case.  See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 
183 n.7 (1997) (noting defendant cannot establish that district 
court abused its discretion “by a mere showing of some 
alternative means of proof that the prosecution in its broad 
discretion chose not to rely upon”).  But the existence of a 
stipulation of the kind in place here is a factor in the Rule 403 
balancing that district courts must undertake. 
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deciding to admit it under Rule 403.24
                                              
24 The type of evidence at issue will determine what 
level of examination is in order.  Because of the impact that 
visual images may have on a jury, if that type of evidence is 
challenged on Rule 403 grounds, courts should be prepared to 
view it before putting it before a jury.  Cf. United States v. 
Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted) 
(“Eyewitness testimony is often dramatic and convincing, but 
its effectiveness and convincing power are almost negligible 
in comparison with a film or videotape of actual events.  
When the videotape shows a crime actually being committed, 
it simply leaves nothing more to be said.”); United States v. 
Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
district court abused discretion in admitting photographs of 
spousal abuse over a Rule 403 objection in part because those 
“photographs impressed the fact of the domestic abuse on the 
jury’s consciousness with dramatic, graphic impact, making 
clear the seriousness of the incident”); United States v. Lopez-
Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 749 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Mug shots, in 
particular, are highly prejudicial, and their visual impact can 
leave a lasting impression on a jury.”). 
  However, as Loughry 
reflects, while that is the best course, see 660 F.3d at 971 
(“The safest course, however, is for the court to review the 
contested evidence for itself.”), it may be that, when a court 
has been provided with a sufficiently detailed description of 
the challenged evidence and decides to reject the evidence, it 
need not undertake that further review.  In other words, if, 
after reviewing a detailed description of the evidence, it is 
obvious to the court that the probative value of the evidence is 
so minimal that it is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, a court need not personally examine it.  
See id.  This ought not be seen as an invitation to freely deny 
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the admission of evidence that no one of ordinary sensibilities 
would want to review.  Any such approach would, of course, 
be out of keeping with the district court’s obligation, however 
uncomfortable, to weigh the potential probative and 
prejudicial impact of evidence, while considering the 
legitimate interests of both the prosecution and the defense. 
 
The video excerpts here included “the kind of highly 
reprehensible and offensive content that might lead a jury to 
convict because it thinks that the defendant is a bad person 
and deserves punishment, regardless of whether the defendant 
committed the charged crime.”  Id. at 972.  Although we 
accord district courts broad discretion in making a Rule 403 
determination, that discretion is not unfettered.  “The 
hackneyed expression, ‘one picture is worth a thousand 
words’ fails to convey adequately the comparison between 
the impact of the … portrayal of actual events upon the 
viewer of the videotape and that of the spoken or written 
word upon the listener or reader.”  United States v. Martin, 
746 F.2d 964, 971-72 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).  The 
District Court’s refusal here to view the video excerpts to 
assess their prejudicial impact and instead, over objection, 
rely only on written descriptions prior to admitting them, was 
“arbitrary … [and] unreasonable.”  Green, 617 F.3d at 239 
(citation and internal quotations marks omitted).  
 
2. Substantive Error 
 
Cunningham also argues that the District Court abused 
its discretion under Rule 403 by not limiting or excluding the 
video excerpts.  Because the government had alternative 
means to present its case, including “witness testimony, still 
images, shorter video clips, [his] proffered stipulations, 
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and/or the actual stipulations” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 22), 
Cunningham asserts that the probative value of the video 
excerpts was substantially outweighed by the danger of their 
unfair prejudice.   
 
In the main, the government is “entitled to prove its 
case free from any defendant’s option to stipulate the 
evidence away.”  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 
189 (1997).  That rule “rests on good sense” because “[a] 
syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a 
courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that 
would be used to prove it.”  Id.  Moreover, if the government 
uses testimony or other tangible evidence to describe a series 
of events, but then interrupts that pattern by “announcing a 
stipulation or admission, the effect may be like saying, ‘never 
mind what’s behind the door,’ and jurors may well wonder 
what they are being kept from knowing,” or whether the 
government is “responsible for cloaking something.”  Id.  
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “persuasive 
power of the concrete and particular is often essential to the 
capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places 
on them.”  Id. at 187. 
 
Under those well-established principles, the 
government is entitled to put forward relevant evidence it 
chooses to present its case.  That evidence, however, remains 
subject to Rule 403.  As noted earlier, supra note 6, Rule 403 
provides that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … 
unfair prejudice … or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  The discretion district courts 
enjoy in this regard is broad indeed.  “[I]f judicial restraint is 
ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is 
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reviewed by an appellate tribunal.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. 
Albert, 241 F.3d 344, 347 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal 
quotations marks omitted); see Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183 n.6 
(noting, in the context of Rule 403, that “[i]t is important that 
a reviewing court evaluate the trial court’s decision from its 
perspective when it had to rule and not indulge in review by 
hindsight”).  However, because the District Court abused its 
discretion when it decided not to watch the videos before 
admitting them under Rule 403, its underlying Rule 403 
determination is not entitled to the full range of deference that 
we would normally give to it on appeal.  See Curtin, 489 F.3d 
at 957 (noting that district court must know precisely what the 
evidence contains “in order for its weighing discretion to be 
properly exercised and entitled to deference on appeal”).  In 
that light, we conclude that the District Court did not properly 
exercise its discretion in admitting all of the video excerpts. 
 
We begin our analysis by setting forth the elements of 
the charged crimes that the government had to prove.  Counts 
One and Three were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), 
which provides that “any person who … knowingly receives, 
or distributes, any visual depiction … if the producing of such 
visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; and … such visual depiction is of 
such conduct … shall be punished as provided in [§ 
2252(b)(1)25
                                              
25 Subject to exceptions not relevant here, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(b)(1) states, “[w]hoever violates … paragraph … (2) 
… of subsection (a) shall be … imprisoned not less than 5 
years and not more than 20 years … .”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(b)(1). 
].”  18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  Count Two was 
brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which 
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provides that “any person who … knowingly possesses … 
video tapes … if the producing of such visual depiction 
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct; and … such visual depiction is of such conduct … 
shall be punished as provided in [§ 2252(b)(2)26
 
].”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B).  The parties stipulated that the videos 
recovered contained “visual depictions of real children under 
the age of 18 years of age engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”  (App. at 196-97.) 
The government argues that the video excerpts were 
“highly probative because the content of the videos verified 
the accuracy of many of the lurid file names the government 
had admitted into evidence,” and “they also tended to show 
knowledge of the distribution, receipt and possession of child 
pornography.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 42.)  Even with the parties’ 
stipulation, we recognize that showing the video excerpts here 
had some probative value because they had a tendency to 
show that the offender knew the videos contain child 
pornography.  Although Cunningham correctly argues that 
the stipulation limited the probative value of those excerpts, 
he cannot dictate to the government how to prove its case.  
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183 n.7.  Moreover, the agreed upon 
stipulation obviously falls far short of the evidentiary impact 
made by the video excerpts the government wanted to 
present.  See id. at 187 (speaking of the “persuasive power of 
the concrete and particular[,]” and observing that “[e]vidence 
…  has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, … with 
                                              
26 Subject to exceptions not relevant here, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(b)(2) states, “[w]hoever violates … paragraph (4) of 
subsection (a) shall be … imprisoned not more than 10 years 
… .”  18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). 
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power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the 
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they 
may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.”)  
 
In addition, the two separate sets of video clips each 
had probative value.  The first set, which formed the basis for 
the distribution charge as set forth in Count Three, contained 
three excerpts from three of the six videos that Erdely 
recovered from the IP address registered to Cunningham’s 
mother during Erdely’s undercover investigation on June 19, 
2007.  The second set, which formed the basis for the receipt 
and possession charges as set forth in Counts One and Two, 
contained four excerpts from videos that were retrieved 
following the search and seizure of the computer found in 
Cunningham’s bedroom on July 17, 2007.  Thus, each of the 
video excerpts “was derived from files charged in the 
indictment; the images shown to the jury were … not 
extrinsic to the crime charged ‘but rather a part of the actual 
pornography possessed.’”  United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 
1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Dodds, 
347 F.3d 893, 898 (11th Cir. 2003)).27
                                              
27 Ganoe also stated, however, that “[e]ven more 
importantly [for the Rule 403 analysis], for every image 
shown to the jury there was forensic evidence that the files 
had actually been opened and viewed after downloading.”  
538 F.3d at 1124.  As Cunningham correctly notes, the 
government did not prove that the images shown to the jury 
had actually been opened and viewed.  However, we do not 
hold that such forensic evidence is required to prove that 
video excerpts tend to show that a defendant knowingly 
possessed, received, or distributed child pornography.  See 
Dodds, 347 F.3d at 899 (finding that the admission of images 
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Even though the two sets of videos were probative, 
however, the law of diminishing marginal returns still 
operates.  The probative value of each clip was reduced by 
the existence of the clips before it.  Once one video excerpt 
from each of the two videos was shown, the fact being proven 
– i.e., that the person distributing, receiving, and possessing 
that pornography would know that it contained images of real 
minors engaging in sexually explicit activity – may well have 
been established.  As a result, after one excerpt from each 
video was displayed, the probative value of the remaining 
excerpts became diminished because knowledge of 
distribution, receipt, and possession had already been 
established in some degree by the prior video excerpts.  Thus, 
any of the three excerpts from the first video would have 
diminished probative value if one or two of the other video 
excerpts from the first video had already been shown.  
Likewise, any of the four excerpts from the second video 
would have diminished probative value if one or two of the 
other video excerpts from the second video had already been 
shown.   
 
The question in the end, of course, is whether the 
probative value of the clips shown was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or the needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.  See Fed. R. Evid. 403.  
                                                                                                     
of child pornography tended to show that defendant knew the 
images were child pornography because there was testimony 
that defendant viewed adult pornography on his computer, 
and thus it was reasonable for the prosecution to show that 
defendant would have been aware that this was not adult 
pornography).  Here, there was testimony that Cunningham 
had viewed both adult and child pornography. 
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As Rule 403 clarifies, a party is not protected from all 
prejudice – only unfair prejudice.  See Fed R. Evid. 403; see 
United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 279 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“It must always be remembered that unfair prejudice is what 
Rule 403 is meant to guard against … .”).   
 
Here, the aggregate risk of unfair prejudice was 
tremendous.  Although the videos in question were not 
presented to this Court, the detailed descriptions we have 
received show that at least two of them should clearly have 
been excluded under Rule 403.  Those two video excerpts, 
part of the second set of video clips, portray bondage or 
actual violence.  Although all of the video excerpts are 
described as portraying deeply disturbing images, the 
descriptions of the depraved and violent sexual acts in 
Excerpt 1 and Excerpt 3 from the second video, see supra 
note 11 and accompanying text, let alone the actual video 
images, are enough to “generate even more intense disgust” 
and cause us to conclude that the videos themselves surely 
“outweigh[] any probative value they might have” as to the 
charges of knowingly distributing, receiving, and possessing 
child pornography.28
 
  Curtin, 489 F.3d at 964 (Kleinfeld, J., 
concurring); see Loughry, 660 F.3d at 974 (citing Judge 
Kleinfeld’s concurrence in Curtin for the proposition that 
“video excerpts shown to the jury … [of] men raping and 
ejaculating in the genitals of prepubescent girls … have a 
strong tendency to produce intense disgust”).   
                                              
28 We claim no expertise on the psychological impact 
that different types of child pornography may have on a jury, 
but think common sense dictates our conclusion. 
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“While all depictions of an adult engaging in sexual 
acts with a young child are bound to be repulsive, the impact 
on the jury will depend upon the nature and severity of the 
acts depicted.”  Loughry, 660 F.3d at 972.  Even in the 
cesspool of evidence presented here, Excerpts 1 and 3 in the 
second set of video clips stand out.  We will not repeat the 
description of them but note simply that their violent and 
sadistic character likely created “disgust and antagonism” 
toward Cunningham which risked “overwhelming prejudice” 
toward him.29
                                              
29 With striking exaggeration, the government argues 
that “the record reflects that the district court used ‘just about 
every tool at its disposal to minimize the inflammatory nature 
of the [video excerpts].’” (Appellee’s Br. at 45 (quoting 
Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1124).)  Although the Court did give a 
cautionary instruction before and after the videos were 
played, there were a number of additional steps the Court 
could have taken to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice, 
including those suggested by the defense.  See supra Part 
I.B.1.  The Court did not watch the video excerpts prior to 
ruling on their admissibility and did not limit the 
government’s video excerpts, except to order what the 
government had already accepted, namely eliminating the 
audio on the clips.  Rather, the Court only hoped that the 
government would abide by its representation to present the 
videos in a condensed format.   
  See United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 
996 (2d Cir. 1993) (admission of testimony regarding videos 
“depicting bestiality and sadomasochism” created “disgust 
and antagonism toward” the defendant, “and resulted in 
overwhelming prejudice against him”).  Without those two 
videos, the government still had the entire footage of the first 
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set of videos and additional material from the second set.30  
We disagree with the government’s contention, made to the 
District Court, that all of those video excerpts needed to be 
shown to “fully appreciate the nature of child pornography 
crimes.”  (App. at 227.)  Given the other available evidence, 
the government did not need to show videos of pre-pubescent 
children being bound, raped, and violently assaulted to prove 
that Cunningham knowingly possessed, received, and 
distributed child pornography.31
 
  In addition, the more video 
excerpts were shown, the more it became a needless 
presentation of unfairly prejudicial and cumulative evidence.  
See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
                                              
30 It also seems clear that the government had other 
evidence available to it from the child porn collection found 
on the computer seized from Cunningham’s bedroom. 
31 We do not hold that violent videos like these, 
unspeakable though they are, would never be admissible.  
There may be circumstances where it would be appropriate to 
show them, given the crimes charged and the other evidence 
available.  We only speak in the context of this case, in which 
there is ample evidence of the crimes charged without those 
extraordinarily prejudicial video clips.  Nor does anything we 
have said here limit the government to offering at a retrial 
only the evidence that was adduced at the first trial.  
Likewise, nothing we have said prevents the District Court 
from excluding, after it has viewed them, more videos than 
the two we have discussed, if the Court, in its sound 
discretion, considers exclusion to be warranted under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
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We recognize that a district court “is not required to 
scrub the trial clean of all evidence that may have an 
emotional impact.’”  Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1124 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, we do not hold that 
the admission here of video excerpts or other images was per 
se improper.  Indeed, courts are in near-uniform agreement 
that the admission of child pornography images or videos is 
appropriate, even where the defendant has stipulated, or 
offered to stipulate, that those images or videos contained 
child pornography.  See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 
F.3d 142, 153 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Schene, 543 
F.3d 627, 643 (10th Cir. 2008); Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1123-24; 
United States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 120 (1st 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Sewell, 457 F.3d 841, 844 (8th 
Cir. 2006); Dodds, 347 F.3d at 898-99.  We also decline to 
adopt a bright-line rule on the number of video excerpts that 
can be shown or on the maximum length of time that video 
excerpts can last.  However, in light of the content of the 
videos besides the bondage clips, the probative value of those 
two violent excerpts was extremely limited.  Accordingly, 
this is a case where we can confidently say that the probative 
value of some of the video excerpts was “so minimal that it 
[was] obvious … that the potential prejudice to the defendant 
substantially outweigh[ed] any probative value that [they] 
might have.”  Loughry, 660 F.3d at 971 (citation omitted).  
Therefore, the Court abused its discretion in admitting the 
bondage videos. 
 
The government argues that the District Court’s errors 
do not require us to vacate Cunningham’s conviction, 
contending that any error in admitting the video excerpts was 
harmless.  “The test for harmless error is whether it is ‘highly 
probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.’”  
41 
 
United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 540 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 
275, 286 (3d Cir. 1999)).  “This ‘[h]igh probability’ requires 
that the court possess a ‘sure conviction that the error did not 
prejudice the defendant.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d at 286).  “Here, given the 
depraved and patently prejudicial nature” of at least two of 
the video excerpts, Curtin, 489 F.3d at 958, we do not have a 
sure conviction that the erroneous admission of those two 
excerpts did not prejudice Cunningham. 
 
It is difficult to divorce the procedural error from the 
substantive error in this case.  Procedural error often begets 
substantive error, and we believe that the substantive error of 
admitting all of the video excerpts here was prompted by the 
procedural error of failing to review those excerpts prior to 
ruling on their admissibility.  Cf. United States v. Goff, 501 
F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting, in the sentencing 
context, that the substantive problems in the district court’s 
opinion “[were] a product of the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s 
procedurally flawed approach,” and by “disregarding 
[sentencing] procedures, the [d]istrict [c]ourt put at risk the 
substantive reasonableness of any decision it reached”).  
Unless “the probative value of the evidence is so minimal that 
it will be obvious to the court that the potential prejudice to 
the defendant substantially outweighs any probative value the 
evidence might have,” Loughry, 660 F.3d at 871 (citation 
omitted), district courts should take the procedural step of 
personally examining disputed evidence in a case like this, 
prior to making a Rule 403 determination to admit the 
evidence. 
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B. Voir Dire 
 
Cunningham also argues that the District Court abused 
its discretion during voir dire by failing to publish the video 
excerpts to potential jurors that would be played during trial, 
or otherwise failing to inform them that there would be video 
excerpts shown of young children being sexually assaulted.  
Specifically, Cunningham claims that the District Court’s 
questions during voir dire were too general for potential 
jurors to understand the “unfathomable nature of the evidence 
that would be presented at trial,” and thus “any assurances of 
impartiality” given by potential jurors were “uninformed and 
unreliable in violation of [his] Sixth Amendment right to be 
tried by an impartial jury.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 106.)  
Although we reject Cunningham’s assertion that the video 
excerpts to be shown at trial had to be played to all potential 
jurors during voir dire, his assertion that more information 
about the videos should have been provided to potential jurors 
does warrant further discussion. 
 
One of the purposes of voir dire is to “enabl[e] the 
court to select an impartial jury,” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 
U.S. 415, 431 (1991), a purpose that implicates the Sixth 
Amendment, United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 
304, 311 (2000).  Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
the right to be tried “by an impartial jury,”  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI, “the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to 
appellate review,” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 
182, 188 (1981).  “We review [a] district court’s conduct of 
voir dire for abuse of discretion.”  Butler v. City of Camden, 
City Hall, 352 F.3d 811, 814 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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A district court’s function during voir dire “is not 
unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial.  Both must reach 
conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on 
their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses 
to questions.”  Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188 (citations 
omitted).  “In neither instance can an appellate court easily 
second-guess the conclusions of the decision-maker who 
heard and observed the witnesses.”  Id.  “Because the 
obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first 
instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely 
on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been 
accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct 
the voir dire.”  Id. at 189. 
 
Here, the District Court asked jurors about whether 
they could be fair and impartial in a case that involved child 
pornography, specifically informing them that they would be 
“shown child pornography including graphic images and hear 
descriptions of computer files and offensive file names which 
w[ould] certainly be disturbing to most if not all of [them].”  
(App. at 302-03.)  After providing that warning, several 
potential jurors indicated that they may not be able to be fair 
and impartial, and those potential jurors were excused for 
cause.   
 
Cunningham argues that the average person does not 
fully understand that child pornography may consist of videos 
of sexual abuse involving prepubescent children, and thus 
would not understand the nature of the child pornography in 
the video excerpts that were eventually shown at trial.  To 
support that claim, Cunningham points to the fact that a few 
potential jurors were excused for cause during individual 
sidebar conferences only after receiving more detailed 
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descriptions of the videos that would be played at trial.  We 
do not think that fact undermines the effectiveness of the voir 
dire, however.  While more detail may have been useful, the 
District Court’s decision to not provide more graphic 
information to the entire pool of potential jurors was not an 
abuse of discretion.  Without minimizing the importance of 
removing the possibility of bias from a jury, we refrain from 
“second-guess[ing] the conclusions of the decision-maker,” 
Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189, especially in light of the 
clear instructions the District Court provided about the 
graphic nature of the child pornography to be shown.  On 
remand, “accord[ing] ample discretion” to the District Court 
“in determining how best to conduct the voir dire,” id. at 188, 
we leave it to that Court to determine if more detailed 
information about the case would be advisable to ensure a fair 
and impartial jury. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The District Court abused its discretion by failing to 
view the video excerpts before ruling them admissible.  That 
lapse in proper procedure produced the substantive error of 
presenting to the jury evidence which bore the danger of 
unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed any probative 
value.  Those errors were not harmless and we will therefore 
vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for a 
new trial.32
                                              
32 Given the District Court’s July 31, 2012 order, see 
supra note 
  On remand, unless the Court determines that, 
considering the potential of unfair prejudice, the probative 
value of a proposed video excerpt is so minimal that it need 
13, we will direct the Chief Judge of the District 
Court to reassign this matter. 
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not watch that excerpt, the Court must view the proposed 
video excerpts to not only assess their probative value and 
potential for unfair prejudicial impact but also to 
appropriately evaluate their admissibility in light of Rule 
403’s concern with redundancy.   
